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Abstract
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem is an NP-hard problem that lies the foundation of several cryptographic algorithms.
Generalizing this principle, several cryptosystems based on the closely related Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem have
been proposed within the NIST PQC standardization process, e.g., the systems LAC and NewHope. The combination of encryption
and decryption for these kinds of algorithms can be interpreted as data transmission over noisy channels. To the best of our
knowledge this paper is the first work that analyzes the capacity of this channel. In particular, we present lower bounds on the
capacity, which show that the transmission rate can be significantly increased compared to standard proposals in the literature.
Furthermore, under the assumption of stochastically independent coefficient failures we give achievability bounds as well as
concrete code constructions achieving a decryption failure rate (DFR) less than 2−112 for LAC and less than 2−216 for NewHope
for their highest proposed security levels. Our results show that the data rate of the encryption scheme is significantly increased for
NewHope, namely by factor of 7 and for LAC by a factor of 2. This is partly based on choosing larger alphabet sizes. Furthermore
we show how to significantly decrease the decryption failure rate compared to the original proposals while achieving the same
bit rate. We also show that the measures we take to achieve these results have no negative impact on the security level. Thus, by
means of our constructions, we can either increase the total bit rate while guaranteeing the same DFR or for the same bit rate,
we can significantly reduce the DFR (e.g., for NewHope from 2−216 to 2−12764).
Index Terms
Ring Learning with Errors, RLWE-channel, channel capacity, error correcting codes
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of most currently deployed asymmetric encryption schemes as well as digital signatures is based on the hardness
of integer factorization or the discrete logarithm problem. In 1999, Shor developed quantum algorithms that are able to solve
both of these problems in polynomial time with respect to the size of the integer to factorize or the size of the group over
which the discrete logarithm problem is defined [1].
So far, no quantum computers exists that uses a sufficient amount of qubits to actually break currently used schemes like
RSA. However, driven by companies like Google and IBM significant progress has been made recently. It is therefore essential
to develop post-quantum (PQ)-secure cryptographic schemes already now. On the one hand, this is due to the requirement
of long-term security for devices that are hard to update (e.g., satellites). On the other hand, developing and analyzing new
algorithms by the cryptographic community is an extensive and time-intensive process as standardized algorithm will be
deployed in worldwide cryptographic interfaces which can only be changed with great effort (if at all). Therefore, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has started a PQ standardization (NIST-PQC) [2] in order to find public key
cryptographic schemes that withstand attackers having access to a quantum computer.
The security of several encryption and signature schemes that are considered in the NIST competition is based on the
hardness of certain problems on lattices. We refer to this family of primitives as lattice-based schemes. Several of those
schemes are based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem which was shown to be reducible to the decisional version of
the shortest vector problem (GapSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) on lattices [3]. The Ring Learning
with Errors (RLWE) problem can be reduced to GapSVP and SIVP in a subclass of lattices, so-called ideal lattices [4]. The
major advantage of basing a cryptographic scheme on the RLWE problem rather than the LWE problem are the smaller key
size compared to LWE and that the computations within those schemes can be implemented very efficiently (e.g., by using
the number theoretic transform (NTT) for the polynomial multiplications).
In [5] it has been suggested to view the LWE-based cryptographic scheme Frodo [6] as a digital communication system.
Exchanging messages between two parties, in the following called Alice and Bob, in a secure manner using RLWE-based
algorithms can also be considered as data transmission over a noisy channel, in the following referred to as the RLWE-channel.
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2Consequently, we can find the channel capacity of this cryptographic channel by using Shannon’s noisy channel capacity
theorem presented in his fundamental paper [7]. To our knowledge, this paper is the first that analyzes the capacity and other
information-theoretic properties of the RLWE channel.
It is possible to choose the parameter sets of LWE/RLWE based public key encryption schemes such that the decryption
of the ciphertext never fails if the recipient knows the private key. Although this property is desirable, there are practical
reasons why a very small decryption failure probability (also called rate) (DFR) has been permitted by the designers of several
algorithms. Those reasons are the possibility of achieving smaller key sizes, smaller ciphertext sizes, and a lower complexity
of encryption and decryption. A low decryption failure rate is not only essential since retransmissions cost data rate, but they
provide information for an attacker that tries to break the cryptosystem [8].
A possible measure to decrease the DFR involves the usage of suitable error-correcting codes (ECC). This approach is for
instance taken in LAC [9]. In this work, we consider the parameter set of LAC for an equivalent security level of AES256 as
well as the parameter set of NewHope1024 [10]. In principle, our results are much more general, but we illustrate the results
for these special parameters and show that the practical transmission rate and/or DFR can be significantly improved for these
cases. For an analysis on the impact of ECCs in NewHope Simple [11] see [12]. In this work the effect of using a BCH code,
an LDPC code and their concatenation is analyzed. However, only the influence of one specific BCH code is analyzed whereas
in this work we are optimizing the BCH parameters with respect to different alphabet sizes.
In Section II, we introduce basic notation, introduce lattices, some mathematical terminology and recap the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound. Section III deals with the basics of RLWE-based cryptography and lattice-based cryptography in general. In Section IV,
we show how to connect RLWE-based cryptosystems to communication theory in the Shannon sense. The consequences of
these results naturally leads to the information-theoretic analysis presented in Section V. In this section we also show how
to bound the decryption failure rate of RLWE-based schemes under the assumption of stochastically independent coefficient
failures. Section VI deals with the DFR of RLWE-based cryptosystems depending on the ECCs and the decryption procedure
in general. In Section VII, we deal with the influence that ciphertext compression has on the RLWE-channel. In Section VIII
we are computing the decryption failure rate for a fixed bitrate of 14 for the RLWE-channel. Finally in Section IX we sum up
the results and conclude the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
In this paper, polynomials are denoted as lowercase letters in bold font. For a polynomial a, the i-th coefficient is denoted
as ai unless otherwise mentioned. Sampling an element b from a distribution χ is denoted by b
$←− χ and sampling uniformly
from a set S is denoted by b $←− S . We refer to the binomial distribution by B(i, n, p), where i denotes the number of successes,
n the number of trials and p the success probability. We define the magnitude of an element in Zq by the magnitude of its
representation in the interval [−q/2, q/2].
We denote the rounding operator as d.c where we round x.5 up.
We denote the convolution of two distributions PX and PY by PX ∗ PY and we denote the n-fold convolution of PX with
itself by ©∗ n(PX) := PX ∗ PX ∗ · · · ∗ PX .
Definition 1 (Centered binomial distribution). The centered binomial distribution with parameter k, denoted as χk, is defined
as χk(x) := B(x+ n2 , n, 12 ), where x ∈ {−n2 ,−n2 + 1, . . . , n2 }.
The distribution is plotted for k = 8 in Fig. 1. The expectation of the centered binomial distribution χk is 0 and its variance
is k2 . It is possible to sample relatively efficient from this distribution compared to, e.g., the rounded Gaussian distribution.
In order to do so consider that the sampling algorithm has access to identically independently sampled random bits, where
P (0) = 1/2. We can generate one sample from the centered binomial distribution by using 2n random bits b0, . . . , b2n−1 and
computing
n−1∑
i=0
b2i+1 − b2i .
Definition 2 (Lattice). A lattice L is defined as the set of linear combinations over the integers Z of a set of linearly independent
vectors b1, . . . , bn ∈ Rm.
L :=
{
n∑
i=1
αibi : αi ∈ Z, i = 1, . . . , n
}
There are several computationally hard problems defined on lattices. An detailed description of the examples shown below
can be found in [13] and [14].
1) The shortest vector problem (SVP): Given a basis of a lattice L, find a shortest non-zero vector with respect to the
Euclidean distance contained within the lattice.
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Fig. 1. Centered binomial distribution χ8
2) The closest vector problem (CVP): Given a basis of a lattice L and a point p not necessarily contained within the lattice
L, find a closest vector within the lattice with respect to the Euclidean distance to p.
3) The GapSVP problem (decisional version of the SVP): Given a vector v ∈ L, decide whether there exists a vector within
the lattice that is shorter than v.
4) The shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP): find a shortest set of n linearly independent lattice vectors where the
length of the set is determined by its longest contained vector.
5) For all these problems there are relaxations that involve an additional parameter that is frequently denoted by γ. The
SVPγ for example deals with finding a vector that is not longer than γ times a shortest vector of L. Similar relaxations
are frequently used for the other previously mentioned problems as well.
Definition 3 ([15]). A negligible function f from the natural to the non-negative real numbers in some parameter λ satisfies
that there exists a number N such that for all λ > N it holds that
f(λ) <
1
p(λ)
for every positive polynomial p .
B. The Ring Rq
Let Rq := Zq[x]/(xn + 1) be the polynomial ring in x of degree n with coefficients in Zq .
The addition of two polynomials in Rq is performed by adding the coefficients in Zq:
a(x) + b(x) = c(x), where ck = ak + bk mod q. (1)
The multiplication of two polynomials in Rq is defined by
a(x) · b(x) = c(x), where ck =
k∑
i=0
aibk−i −
n−1∑
i=k+1
aibn−i+k . (2)
It is possible to represent each polynomial in Zq[x]/(xn + 1) by a polynomial in Zq[x] of degree < n.
C. Gilbert-Varshamov Bound
We denote a linear (block) code C over Fq with parameters [n, k, d]q , where we denote its block length by n, its dimension
by k, and its minimum Hamming distance by d. The Gilbert–Varshamov (GV) bound [16], [17] can be used to show that
codes with certain parameters exist. We recap it here.
Theorem 1 (GV bound). For any parameter set [n, k, d]q fulfilling the inequality
qn−k >
d−2∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
(q − 1)i, (3)
there exists a linear [n, k, d]q code.
4III. RLWE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
A. The LWE and RLWE Problems
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem was introduced in 2005 by Regev [18]. It is basically a natural extension of the
Learning with Parity (LPN) problem.
Definition 4 (LWE Problem, Search Version). Let q be a positive integer, let {a1, . . . ,am} be and a set of vectors sampled
uniformly and independently from the set Znq and let the the vector s have been sampled coefficient-wise from the error
distribution χ as well as the elements e1, . . . , em. Given the the values b1, . . . , bn and the vectors a1, . . . ,am, find the vector
s such that:
〈a1, s〉+ e1 = b1 mod q
〈a2, s〉+ e2 = b2 mod q
...
Definition 5 (LWE Problem, Decisional Version). Consider samples drawn from the distribution of
(ai, 〈ai, s〉+ ei), i = 1, . . . ,m,
where the ai are sampled from the uniform distribution on Znq and the ei are sampled according to the error distribution χ. s
is also sampled from the error distribution χ but it remains the same for all samples. Given elements in Znq ×Znq the adversary’s
task is then to distinguish whether those samples have been obtained by sampling from the aforementioned distribution or the
uniform distribution on Znq × Znq with non-negligible advantage.
Remark 1. Originally for the LWE problem s was sampled from the uniform distribution on Znq . In [19] it was shown how
to transform the original LWE-problem into the form presented in Definition 5, where s is sampled from the error distribution
χ. Furthermore it has already been shown in [3] that the search version and the decisional version of the LWE problem are
equivalent. Therefore, solving the search version of LWE presented in Definition 4 implies solving the originally proposed LWE
problem by Regev [18].
Since the performance of LWE based cryptographic schemes is not convincing and the resulting key sizes are large, the
LWE problem was modified to be defined over polynomial rings rather than vectors, resulting in the Ring Learning with Errors
(RLWE) problem. Here, each noisy product gives multiple pseudorandom values compared to one in the LWE setting, thereby
reducing key sizes.
The RLWE problem is similar to the LWE problem. The difference is that it is defined over polynomials rather than vectors.
Definition 6 (RLWE Problem, Search Version). Let {a1, . . . ,am and s} be sampled from the uniform distribution on the ring
Rq and let {e1, . . . , em} be sampled from the error distribution χ (also defined on Rq). Given the the polynomials a1, . . . ,am
and the polynomials b1, . . . , bm, find a polynomial s such that:
(ai, bi = ais+ ei) i = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 7 (RLWE Problem, Decisional Version). Consider samples of the form:
(ai, bi = ais+ ei) i = 1, . . . ,m. (4)
where the ai are drawn from the uniform distribution on Rq and s and the ei (both in Rq) are drawn from the error distribution
χ. The adversary’s task is to distinguish this set of samples from uniform samples on Rq ×Rq .
Remark 2. Similar as for the LWE problem, the decisional version of the RLWE problem was originally defined by sampling
s from the uniform distribution on Rq . Again by putting the system into systematic from as shown in [19] it can be shown that
the RLWE problem as introduced in Definition 7 can be obtained from the original problem deterministically in polynomial
time.
The security of LWE-based cryptosystems relies on the hardness of certain problems on lattices. Those problems have been
shown to be of particular interest for cryptographic purposes in [20]. In this work it was shown for certain lattice problems
that their worst-case hardness implies hardness of those problems in the average case.
The SVP is known to be a NP-hard under a randomized reduction hypothesis [21]. A proof for the NP-hardness of the
CVP is presented in [22].
B. Public Key Encryption based on RLWE
Each public key encryption (PKE) scheme is composed of three functions: key generation, encryption, and decryption. The
first one generates the required public and private keys, the second one is for encryption and the last one is for decryption.
The basic building blocks for RLWE-based schemes are presented in Algorithms 1, 2 and 3.
5The major difference between different RLWE-based cryptosystems is their choice of the parameters [n, q, k], where n denotes
the number of coefficients within the polynomials of the ring Rq , q denotes coefficient modulus of Rq and k parametrizes
the error distribution (e.g. controls its variance). Additionally, in some RLWE-based or Module-LWE [23] (which is another
variant of LWE) based schemes (e.g. [10], [24]) a technique called ciphertext compression is used to reduce the size of the
ciphertext. In comparison to schemes which are based on the Learning with Rounding problem [25] (e.g. [26]), ciphertext
compression in RLWE-based schemes is deployed to decrease the ciphertext size and therefore increase the communication
rate of the scheme rather than using it to make the cryptosystem secure. Therefore, we ignore ciphertext compression in the
first parts of this work and address this topic later in this work. Although the numerical results we obtain without this measure
are different, the principles presented throughout this work do not depend on it.
We consider the scenario that Alice would like to transmit a message to Bob using an RLWE-based encryption scheme. In
order to do this, Bob generates a key pair (pk, sk) consisting of a public key pk and a secret key sk. The public key is then
used by Alice to encrypt a message m to obtain a ciphertext c which she sends to Bob. Bob then uses his secret key (private
key) sk and the ciphertext c to obtain an estimate m′ for the message m.
C. Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption
In the following, we describe the basic steps (key generation, encryption and decryption) of RLWE-based PKE-schemes
without ciphertext compression.
Notice that the random elements sampled in these algorithms are either sampled from the uniform distribution on some set
or from the error distribution, which we specify to be the centered binomial distribution χk for the algorithms considered in
this work. In general other distributions as the originally proposed rounded Gaussian distribution for LWE [18] and RLWE
are possible as well. The respective distribution family as well as its variance have a significant effect on the achieved security
level. The security of RLWE-based schemes was originally shown for rounded Gaussian error distributions. Later on a security
reduction, where the centered binomial distribution can be used as the error distribution was shown [27]. This is of practical
importance since implementing the sampling from the centered binomial distribution can be done much more efficient compared
to the rounded Gaussian distribution. But caution has to be taken for signature schemes [28] and lattice trapdoor functions
[29] as the shape of the error distribution plays a larger role and the same result does not apply there.
The key generation is shown in Algorithm 1. First, a seed is sampled from a true random number generator. This seed is
then used to generate the encryption key (a, b) ∈ R2q , where b = as + e. The function GenA generates the polynomial a
pseudorandomly from the seed (e.g. [10], [9]). We do not specify how this is done in detail and the pseudorandom number
generator (PRNG) may differ for different algorithms . The PRNG has to be specified in the documentation of the respective
scheme, e.g. [10]. This procedure shrinks the key size compared to just sampling a uniformly from the set Rq . As the pseudo-
random number generator is publicly known, the same seed will generate the same a. Recall that χk denotes the centered
binomial distribution of variance k2 . In order to compute b, the secret key s and another polynomial e are required which are
both sampled from the error distribution.
In order to encrypt a message m we first need to encode it. We use the function Encode/Map to abstract two steps,
namely encoding with an ECC and mapping to a polynomial in Rq . Notice that we have a certain flexibility in the choice
of the encoding and decoding functions which we can use to reduce the overall decryption failure probability of the scheme.
Frequently, error-correcting codes are used within this step, e.g. in LAC, BCH codes are deployed [9]. Therefore, a message
that can be represented by k bits is encoded by an error-correcting code of length at most n, where n is equal to the number
of coefficients of a polynomial in Rq . This error-correcting code can later be used by the receiver to decrease the decryption
failure probability. The codeword is then converted into a polynomial in Rq by multiplying each bit of the codeword by
⌊
q
2
⌋
and by using the resulting sequence sequentially as the coefficients of the polynomial.
The encryption procedure is shown in Algorithm 2. The resulting ciphertext c consists of the two polynomials u and v ∈ Rq
which are computed according to Algorithm 2. The steps to obtain them only involve sampling from the error distribution and
arithmetic operations in Rq .
The decryption is depicted in Algorithm 3. Bob uses the ciphertext c and his secret key s and computes
v − us = bs′ + e′′ + Encode/Map(m)− as′s− e′s = s′e− e′s+ e′′ + Encode/Map(m) ∈ Rq. (5)
This result consists of two basic summands: Encode/Map(m) and s′e− e′s+ e′′, where the latter can be seen as a noise
term which we refer to as the difference noise from now on.
Since all polynomials occurring within the difference noise are sampled from the error distribution, it is likely that the
coefficients of the difference noise are small in magnitude. Therefore, Bob checks for each coefficient in v−us whether it is
closer to 0 or to
⌊
q
2
⌋
modulo q and generates a binary vector d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Z2 in the following way:
di =
{
0 if |(v − us)i| ≤
⌊
q
4
⌋
1 otherwise
6where (v−us)i denotes the i-th coefficient of the resulting polynomial in Rq . In order to make the absolute value well defined
we specify that its argument is considered to be within [−b q2c, b q2c].
He then uses the resulting vector (d1, . . . , dn) as an estimate for the encoded message m′ for the decoder to obtain an
estimate mˆ for the transmitted message m.
Definition 8. We define the event that di 6= m′i to be a coefficient failure in the decoding procedure. We denote it with the
letter E and use indices if we would like to specify the respective coefficient. Notice that this event is considered before its
potential correction due to the deployed ECC.
Definition 9. Let m be the message to be transmitted from the sender to its intended recipient and let mˆ be the output of the
decoder at the receiver side. Then we define a decryption failure to be the event that mˆ 6= m.
We denote the probability of this event as the decryption failure rate (DFR) of the scheme Pfail.
Algorithm 1: Key Generation
seed $←− {0, 1}256
a← GenA(seed)
s, e
$←− χk
b← as+ e
Result: pk = (b, seed), sk = s
Algorithm 2: Encryption
Input: pk = (b, seed), m ∈ {0, . . . , 255}32
a← GenA(seed)
s′, e′, e′′ $←− χk
u← as′ + e′
v ← bs′ + e′′ + Encode/Map(m)
Result: c = (u,v)
Algorithm 3: Decryption
Input: c = (u,v), sk = s
mˆ← Demap/Decode(v − us)
Result: mˆ
D. Transforming the Public Key Encryption scheme into an IND-CCA2 secure KEM
There are different kinds of assumptions on the knowledge an attacker to a cryptosystem may have. A common requirement
for key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) is that they are IND-CCA2-secure. As a reference for the explanation of different
security notions we refer to [15].
The Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [30] can be used to obtain an IND-CCA2 secure KEM from a one-way secure public key
encryption scheme in the classical random oracle model. In [31] the authors proposed a variant of this transform to obtain
IND-CCA2 security against a quantum attacker within the quantum random oracle model. Both of these transforms however
assume the public key encryption scheme to be without any decryption failures. For several LWE/RLWE/MLWE based public
key encryption algorithms impose a low but non-zero decryption failure rate.
In [32] a modular analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform is presented. The authors also address the problem of obtaining
and IND-CCA secure scheme from an IND-CPA secure one even if the decryption failure rate is non-zero. For the security
level however the authors mention that a small decryption failure rate is still very important. For a security level equivalent to
AES256 for LAC (LAC256) [9] a decryption failure rate of 2−122 was estimated whereas for NewHope1024 [10] a decryption
failure rate of 2−216 is reached.
IV. THE RLWE CHANNEL AND INCREASED ALPHABET SIZE
A. Channel Model
The encryption and decryption procedure of RLWE-based cryptosystems can be interpreted as the transmission of symbols
over a communication channel with additive noise. This channel model which we call the RLWE-channel is illustrated in
Fig. 2. The sender’s goal is to transmit a message m contained in the message space M reliably to the receiver.
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Fig. 2. RLWE Channel
The input to this channel is a block of n bits and its output is a block of n bits as well and the additive noise on the channel
follows the same distribution as the difference noise.
The channel flips bit i if and only if |(s′e− e′s+ e′′)i| >
⌊
q
4
⌋
.
We denote this event as E and its probability as Pr(E).
B. Assuming coefficient failures to be stochastically independent with respect to each other
The RLWE channel is a channel with memory as the different bits come from multiplying and adding several polynomials
and are therefore not stochastically independent.
As already mentioned in Subsection III-D the decryption failure rate of the scheme has to be very small in order to obtain
an IND-CCA secure scheme from an IND-CPA secure scheme after transforming it using a variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto
transform.
Therefore, it is crucial to know the decryption failure rate of an RLWE-based scheme in order to estimate its security level.
So far it is unknown how to precisely obtain the decryption failure rate in the RLWE-setting.
In order to estimate the decryption failure rate of RLWE-based cryptosystems it is widely assumed that coefficient failures
within a block occur independently with probability Pr(E) (e.g. [33], [12], [34]), thereby the RLWE-channel is modelled as a
Binary Symmetric Channels (BSC) with error probability Pr(E).
A major problem in terms of estimating the decryption failure rate is that in order to create an IND-CCA2 secure KEM
from a public key encryption algorithm its decryption failure rate has to be very small. Recall that for NewHope the designers
propose a decryption failure rate of about 2−216 and for LAC a decryption failure rate of 2−122 is proposed for their highest
respective security levels [10] [9]. Estimating such a low failure probability by encrypting/decrypting messages and using
Monte Carlo simulations is infeasible. However, it is possible to compute the marginal distribution of the coefficient failure
rate for one coefficient Pr(E). We will show how to obtain an upper bound on Pr(E) in Section IV-C (Theorem 3) for a Q-ary
alphabet size. The binary case is then just a special case of this theorem.
If algebraic codes are considered with hard-decision decoding, the minimum-distance d determines the number of errors
t = bd−12 c up to which the decoder will always output the correct codeword.
Therefore, if we consider stochastically independent coefficient failures an error-correcting code with error-correction capa-
bility of t symbols leads to an overall failure rate of the scheme
Pfail ≤
n∑
j=t+1
(
n
j
)
Pr(E)j(1− Pr(E))n−j . (6)
In general however, the the assumption of independent coefficient failures does not hold in RLWE-based schemes and it has
been shown in [35] that the stochastic dependence between decryption failures has a significant impact on the failure rate of
the LAC proposal [34]. The LAC team therefore changed the error distribution in their Round 2 submission for the NIST-PQC
[9] from χ1 by fixing the number of −1s, +1s and zeros to their expected values according to this distribution. Their sampling
is therefore no more coefficient-wise but rather uniform on the resulting set. In [36] it has been experimentally shown that this
significantly reduces the stochastic dependence of decryption failures and stochastic dependence has been quantified by using
statistical methods.
Although we know that estimating the decryption failure rate by using the assumption of independent coefficient failures is
not completely accurate we consider it to be a reasonable approximation of the real behaviour of RLWE based cryptosystems.
Some statements made in this work make use of this independence assumption. We state at every point where this is the
case and refer to this subsection as a justification for making this assumption.
8C. Generalization to Q-ary alphabets
It is natural to extend the channel input alphabet to be Q-ary. Consider the encoding procedure. So far, the ECC was binary
and the message was mapped to a polynomial with coefficients in {0, ⌊ q2⌋}.
We extend the channel to Q-ary alphabets by using a Q-ary ECC. We split
[− q2 , q2] into smaller parts of size either ⌊ qQ⌋
or
⌈
q
Q
⌉
, where their respective occurrence depends on the remainder of the integer division of q by Q.
The sender maps the Q-ary ECC on the central elements of these intervals and sends those symbols over the channel.
This demapping procedure can be interpreted as a linear quantization in the interval
[− ⌊ q2⌋ , ⌊ q2⌋]. Notice that the choice
of the interval to be quantized is ambiguous in the sense that we are considering elements in Zq and therefore, the interval
could be shifted by multiples of q. We take the center points of each interval to be its reproduction value and in that sense
we have generalized Encode/Map and Demap/Decode for Q = 2 to arbitrary Q. Basically the receiver uses the quantizer
to estimate the symbol transmitted by the sender and uses the ECC to correct possibly erroneous symbols.
Notice that the difference of the decryption function for different alphabet sizes lies entirely in Demap/Decode and in
particular Equation (5) does not change if we consider the Q-ary case because all the information about the input alphabet
size is contained in the functions Encode/Map and Demap/Decode.
The following theorem is based on a result in [37] and proves that generalizing RLWE-based schemes to alphabets of size
Q ≥ 2 does not decrease the security level of the scheme.
Theorem 2. The security level of RLWE-based schemes is not reduced by the generalization to a Q-ary alphabet as long as
the decryption failure rate remains on the same level.
Proof: The proof of this statement is not different from the security proof in the binary case in [37]. We recapitulate it here
for the sake of completeness. By the RLWE-assumption an attacker cannot distinguish samples of the form (a,as+e), where
a
$←− Rq from uniform samples of the set (Rq ×Rq). The ciphertext c = (u,v) cannot be distinguished from the one created
by using a uniform sample on Rq × Rq as the public key of the encryption. This follows because the RLWE-assumption
would be violated otherwise. It follows that (u,v) cannot be distinguished from a uniform sample on Rq × Rq because
(u,v) = (as′ + e′, bs′ + e′′ + Encode/Map(m)) and both components are RLWE-samples. For u this is clear by definition
and for v this is true because otherwise (a, b) could be distinguished from a uniform sample on Rq ×Rq . Within this proof
the size of possible outputs of the function Encode/Map has no influence. Therefore, the system remains IND-CPA-secure
for any Q ≥ 2.
As already mentioned in Subsection III-D a low decryption failure rate is essential to obtain a high security level for the
resulting scheme after the transformation into an IND-CCA secure KEM. Therefore, we have to avoid an increase of the
decryption failure rate in order to keep the same security level.
Remark 3. Generalizing an RLWE-based scheme to a Q-ary alphabet increases the coefficient failure probability if all other
parameters of the system remain the same. In order to keep the overall decryption failure rate on the same level, the error-
correction capability of the deployed ECC has to be increased accordingly.
Next we show how to upper bound the coefficient failure probability Pr(E) which can then be used to obtain an upper
bound on the decryption failure rate similar to Inequality (6). We define the probability distribution of the i-th coefficient of
the difference noise (s′e − e′s + e′′)i by ψ. Indexing the distribution ψ is unnecessary because the all coefficients of the
difference noise are distributed in the same way due to the symmetry of χk.
In order to do so we first prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. We define the distribution of the product of two elements in Zq which have been sampled according to the error
distribution χk by ξk. Then
ψ =©∗ n−1(ξk) ∗©∗ n−1(ξk) ∗ χk (7)
Proof: We mention that adding or subtracting polynomials which are sampled according to χk leads to the same resulting
distributions. This property occurs due to the symmetry of χk with respect to zero (see also Fig. 1). Consider the product of
two polynomials a and b ∈ Rq which have been sampled according to χk. The i-th coefficient of their product equals
(ab)i =
i∑
j=0
ajbi−j −
n−1∑
j=i+1
ajbn−j+i . (8)
We mention that adding or subtracting polynomials which are sampled according to ξk or χk leads to the same resulting
distributions. This property occurs due to the symmetry of χk with respect to zero (see also Fig. 1). Since the coefficients of a
and b are stochastically independent, so are the products in the sum of equation (8). Therefore (ab)i is a sum of independent
random variables and we convolve the distribution of the products to obtain the resulting distribution ©∗ n−1(ξk). Equation (7)
9then follows because the difference noise is composed out of two products of elements in Rq which are added up with another
another polynomial in Rq where all polynomials are sampled according to χk.
Theorem 3. Let the alphabet size be Q and let the probability distribution of a coefficient of the difference noise be denoted
again by ψ. Then the length of an interval is at least b qQc.
Then
Pr(E) ≤ 1−
bq/(2Q)c∑
i=−bq/(2Q)c
ψ(i) := Pr(E)) . (9)
Assuming coefficient failures to occur stochastically independent with respect to each other it follows that
Pfail ≤
n∑
j=t+1
(
n
j
)
Pr(E)j(1− Pr(E))n−j . (10)
Proof: We will show this statement by proving that the probability of a successful reception Pr(S) is lower bounded by
the sum on the right hand side of Inequality (9).
Sending a symbol over the channel which corresponds to a quantization interval of minimal size leads to the highest
coefficient failure probability as the channel noise is additive.
This probability is equal to the sum in Inequality (9) and the statement follows. Inequality (10) is obtained then from
Inequality (9) by using a standard combinatorial argument.
V. INFORMATION-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE RLWE-CHANNEL
A. A Lower bound on the capacity of the RLWE-channel
As mentioned in Subsection IV-B, the overall decryption failure rate may be influenced by the stochastic dependence of
decryption failures within a block.
Therefore, we show next that assuming the coefficient failures to be independent gives a lower bound on the capacity of the
true RLWE channel where failures are not necessarily independent. In Fig. 3, it is depicted what the independence assumption
means to the channel. The upper part illustrates the RLWE channel taking into account the stochastic dependence of decryption
failures within a block whereas the lower part depicts the scenario where we assume the coefficient failures to be stochastically
independent with respect to each other. The channels P (Y |X) are then defined to be the marginalizations of the channel
P (Y n|Xn) taking into account only one symbol.
P (Y n|Xn)
P (Y |X)
P (Y |X)
P (Y |X)
-X
n
-Y
n
...
-
-
-
X1
X2
Xn
-
-
-
Y1
Y2
Yn
Fig. 3. Channel model with and without independence assumption
Lemma 2. Let Xi denote the i-th input symbol to the channel and let Yi denote the i-th output symbol of the channel. We
denote the vectors containing the sequences X1, . . . , Xk and Y1, . . . , Yk by Xk and Y k, respectively. Let H(Xi) = H(Xj)
and let H(Xi|Yi) = H(Xj |Yj) ∀i, j. Furthermore, let the input symbols to the channel be stochastically independent, then
I(Xn;Y n) ≥ nI(X;Y ) , (11)
where we omitted the indices on the right hand side of the previous inequality because the mutual information between I(Xi;Yi)
does not depend on the respective index i.
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Proof:
I(Xn;Y n) = H(Xn)−H(Xn|Y n) (12)
= nH(X)−
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y nXk−1) (13)
≥ nH(X)−
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Yi) (14)
= nH(X)− nH(X|Y ) (15)
= nI(X;Y ) (16)
As we assume stochastic dependence of decryption failures we may consider the transmission symbol by symbol. We specify
the channel to be analyzed here in the following way. Let X be a random variable modelling the input distribution of the
channel and let Y denote the random variable specifying the channel output. We denote the ranges of X and Y by X and Y ,
respectively where |X | = Q.
Lemma 3. Assuming independent coefficient failures, the RLWE-channel belongs to the class of uniformly dispersive channels,
meaning that the set {P (y|x) : y ∈ Y} is the same for all x ∈ X .
Furthermore
H(Y |X) = H(Y |X = x) = H(ψ) (17)
for all x ∈ supp(PX) where psi denotes the distribution of one coefficient according to the difference noise (Lemma1).
Proof: By the definition of the conditional entropy we have
H(Y |X) =
∑
x∈supp(PX)
H(Y |X = x)PX(x) (18)
The i-th channel output
Yi = (Encode/Map(m))i + (s′e− e′s+ e′′)i
where (Encode/Map(m))i denotes the i−th component of the encoded message after the mapper. Since Xi = (Encode/Map(m))i
it follows that
PY |X=x = ψ ∀x ∈ supp(PX)
and therefore {P (y|x) : y ∈ Y} which implies
H(Y |X = x) = H(ψ) ∀x ∈ supp(PX) .
Applying this result to equation (18) proves the first equality of this Lemma.
Corollary 1. For uniformly dispersive channels the computation of the channel capacity can be simplified to
C = max
PX
H(Y )−H(Y |X = a) (19)
for some a ∈ supp(PX).
Proof: The statement follows directly from the channel coding theorem in [7] and Lemma 3.
Corollary 1 states that for uniformly dispersive channels the maximization of the mutual information comes down to the
maximization of an entropy.
Using the property that the channel is uniformly dispersive, we try to find the optimal input distribution in the sense that it
should be as close to the capacity-achieving distribution as possible. We start by showing the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider a random variable Y with distribution PY and consider a random variable Z with the same distribution
except for k events, denoted as ai1 , . . . , aik , where PZ(ai1) = · · · = PZ(aik) =
∑k
j=1 PY (aij )
k . Then H(Y ) ≤ H(Z).
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Proof: By the definition of the entropy the following holds:
H(Z) =
∑
a∈supp(PY ),a/∈{ai1 ,...,aik}
−PY (a) log(PY (a)) +
k∑
j=1
PY (aij ) log
(∑k
j=1 PY (aij )
k
)
= H(Y ) +
k∑
j=1
PY (aij ) log
 PY (aij )∑k
j=1 PY (aij )
k

≥ H(Y ) +
k∑
j=1
PY (aij ) log
(∑k
j=1 PY (aij )k∑k
j=1 PY (aij )k
)
= H(Y ) ,
where the inequality follows from the log-sum inequality.
Next we make use of Lemma 4 to show that the uniform distribution achieves capacity if Q divides q.
Theorem 4. Let q be divisible by Q. Then the probability distribution which maximizes the channel capacity C of the RLWE
channel under the assumption of independent coefficient failures is the uniform distribution on the set X .
The distribution of the output Y can then be computed as follows:
PY (y) =
1
Q
Q−1∑
j=0
ψ
(
y +
jq
Q
)
(20)
Proof: We consider the output distribution for the values {i, i+ qQ , i+ 2qQ , . . . , i+ (Q−1)qQ }.
PY (i) = PX(0)ψ(i) + PX(1)ψ
(
i− q
Q
)
+ · · ·+ PX(Q− 1)ψ
(
i− (Q− 1)q
Q
)
PY
(
i+
q
Q
)
= PX(0)ψ
(
i+
q
Q
)
+ PX(1)ψ(i) + · · ·+ PX (Q− 1)ψ
(
k − (Q− 2)q
Q
)
...
PY
(
i+
(Q− 1)q
Q
)
= PX(0)ψ
(
i+
(Q− 1)q
Q
)
+ PX(1)ψ
(
i+
(Q− 2)q
Q
)
+ · · ·+ PX(Q− 1)ψ(i)
Observe that within each equation the same arguments are occuring within the ξk function (remember that they have to be
considered in Zq) and all equations considered there is exactly one summand for each possible combination of arguments
within PX and ξk. Applying Lemma 4 we find that by changing all values PY (i), PY (i+ q/Q), . . . , PY (i+ (Q− 1)q/Q) to
1
Q
∑Q−1
j=0 PY (i+ j/Q) we can only increase the entropy of the random variable. Therefore, we know we are maximizing the
entropy by that measure. This can be achieved by choosing the uniform distribution over X for PX . Since i was an arbitrary
element we can maximize the entropy for all i by choosing PX to be uniform and equation (20) follows as well.
Combining the results of Theorem 4 and Lemma 2 we give a lower bound on the channel capacity of the RLWE-channel.
Theorem 5. Recall that Q denotes the cardinality of the input alphabet of the channel and that ψ =©∗ n−1(ξk)∗©∗ n−1(ξk)∗χk
denotes the distribution of one coefficient of the difference noise term (Lemma 1), where χk denotes the error distribution and
ξk denotes the distribution of the product of two elements in Zq that were sampled according to χk.
The channel capacity of the RLWE-channel is lower bounded by the mutual information obtained by choosing the input
distribution under the assumption that the difference noise causes stochastically independent coefficient failures, i.e.
CRLWE := max
PXn
I(Xn;Y n) ≥ max
PX
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi) = nmax
PX
I(X;Y ) (21)
where the blocklength is n and Xi, Yi denote the random variables specifying the i-th channel inputs and outputs, respectively.
The last equality holds because I(Xi;Yi) is the same irrespective of the index. This capacity in turn is lower bounded by
choosing uniformly distributed input symbols. In this case we obtain
CRLWE ≥ n
H
 1
Q
Q−1∑
j=0
ψj
−H(ψ)
 (22)
where we define ψj(x) := ψ
(
x+
⌊
jq
Q
⌋)
.
Proof: First we check that the conditions for Lemma 2 are fulfilled. The condition that H(Xi) = H(Xj) ∀i, j follows
from the conditions of Theorem 5 itself. The second one H(Xi|Yi) = H(Xj |Yj) follows from the symmetry of the chosen
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error distribution. Therefore, we can apply the Lemma and show that I(Xn;Y n) ≥ nI(X;Y ) for the RLWE-channel.
Shannon’s noisy channel capacity theorem states that the capacity of a channel with input U and output V is
C = max
PU
I(U ;V ) . (23)
Remember that in the context of the RLWE-channel U=̂Xn and V =̂Y n and therefore it follows that the capacity of the
RLWE-channel is lower bounded by the same channel assuming coefficient failures to occur statistically independent with
respect to each other
CRLWE = max
PXn
I(Xn;Y n) ≥ max
PX
nI(X;Y ) = n(H(Y )−H(Y |X)) . (24)
Remember that by Corollary 1 for the last maximization in Equation (24) reduces to a maximization of H(Y ).
Choosing a particular distribution at the input (in this case the uniform distribution on the set of input symbols) leads to a
lower bound the channel capacity.
Inequality (22) then follows from Theorem 4 and Lemma 3 and the fact that
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) .
Remark 4. Due to Theorem 4 the results for the uniform distribution on the input symbols can be assumed to achieve channel
capacity quasi-tightly. This tightness of the results with respect to a uniform input distribution was verified by experimental
computations. The optimization process almost outputs the uniform distribution which was to be expected. The difference
between the optimized mutual information maxPX I(X;Y ) and I(X;Y ) where PX is chosen to be uniform is negligible.
Remark 5. As given in Equation (22) in order to obtain a lower bound on the capacity of the RLWE-channel the mutual
information I(X;Y ) needs to be multiplied with n, the number of coefficients per polynomial in Rq . We remind the reader
that n has nothing to do with the number of ciphertext blocks that goes to infinity in the sense of Shannon’s channel coding
theorem [7]. Rather n is equal to the length of one ciphertext block in this case.
B. Results for the parameter sets used in LAC and NewHope for [n, q, k]
This subsection shows the influence of Q on the capacity of the channel for two parameter sets. The one for LAC that we
consider is [n, q, k] = [1024, 251, 1] whereas the one for NewHope is [1024, 12289, 8] where we are considering NewHope
without its usual ciphertext compression within this subsection. As shown in Corollary 1 the mutual information is influenced
by PX only via H(Y ) whereas H(Y |X) does not depend on the input distribution. This implies in particular that Q only has
an influence on H(Y ) because the input distribution can be chosen in such a way that for instance only 2 symbols occur with
probability greater than zero. A well known result in information theory states that H(Y ) ≤ |Y| with equality if and only if
PY (y) = 1/|Y|.
In Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 the lower bounds on the capacity obtained by applying Theorem 5 to the aforementioned parameter
sets for LAC and NewHope are plotted. For both parameter sets the results show that the channel capacity can be significantly
increased if larger alphabet sizes Q are considered rather than the originally proposed binary ones.
The plots also show that Q only influences I(X;Y ) for small values. Even for moderate values of Q, I(X;Y ) is almost
constant. The reason for this is depicted in Fig. 5. The probability distribution PY (y) for Q = 2 is far from the uniform
distribution on the set Y whereas for Q = 5 the distribution PY (y) is already rather similar to the uniform distribution on Y .
Therefore, increasing Q cannot increase H(Y ) and consequently I(X;Y ) cannot be increased significantly any further.
A similar saturation effect is shown in Fig. 6 as well but it occurs for a larger Q of approximately 25. The output distributions
for NewHope parameters and Q = 2 and Q = 25 are shown in Fig. 7. For Q = 25 the distribution is not far from the uniform
distribution on Y . Therefore, it is clear that increasing Q cannot significantly increase the mutual information any further.
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VI. A SEMI-CONSTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS FOR OBTAINABLE RATES FOR FINITE BLOCKLENGTHS AND BOUNDED
DECRYPTION FAILURE RATES
A. Influence of Q on the decryption failure rate of the Channel
In Subsection V-B, it was shown that for higher values of Q, where the Q input symbols of the channel/signal points are
quasi-equidistant in Zq , the mutual information I(X;Y ) increases. However, since the adjacent signal points/channel input
symbols are closer to each other, the coefficient failure probability of the channel increases for larger Q as well. This subsection
deals with quantifying this effect.
The coefficient error probability depends on the demapping strategy. The transmitted symbols are almost equidistant in
Zq (recall our definition of distance (cyclic distance) with respect to each other and the error distribution is symmetric and
monotonously decreasing from its center at 0. Therefore, the demapper should output the transmit symbol that is closest to the
received symbol and the quantization approach taken in Subsection IV-C achieves this, which minimizes the coefficient failure
probability.
In Section V information-theoretic methods have been used to analyze the capacity of the RLWE channel. In this section
the influence of error-correcting codes having finite block length on the overall error rate of the channel is analyzed.
We assume that coefficient failures occur in a statistically independent way. Therefore, the decryption failure rate can be
bounded according to Theorem 3.
The coefficient failure probability Pr(E) depends on Q and the error distribution χk. In the following we fix χk but vary Q.
The goal is then to maximize the achievable rate for fixed n having no more than the proposed decryption failure rates Pfail
for LAC and NewHope, respectively.
We use Theorem 3 to find a minimum distance d that guarantees the decryption failure rates which are given in the supporting
documentations of LAC (less than 2−122) [9] and NewHope (less than 2−216) [10]. In Table I the results for LAC and in
Table II the results for NewHope without ciphertext compression are presented. kGV denotes the resulting dimension according
to the Gilbert-Varshamov bound and RGV the corresponding achievable bitrate according to Equation (25).
RGV :=
kGV
n
log2(Q) (25)
Furthermore in both tables parameters for practical BCH-codes are given where nBCH denotes the length of the BCH-code
which is not the same as the blocklength n that we actually use to define the bitrate of the respective BCH-codes. kBCH is
the respective code-dimension. As shown in Equation (26), we define the RBCH in a way as if we were using all n = 1024
coefficients of the encoded message polynomial m′ ∈ Rq . We do this because using a full block is a requirement of the scheme
because changing n has an impact on the security level of the scheme. Therefore, we keep it constant and this has to be taken
into account for a fair comparison of different achievable rates of the BCH-codes.
RBCH :=
kBCH
n
log2(Q) (26)
Q d kGV RGV nBCH kBCH RBCH
2 115 515 0.50293 1023 503 0.49121
3 381 174 0.26932 728 39 0.06036
4 669 20 0.03906 1023 32 0.06250
5 911 1 0.002268 912 1 0.00227
TABLE I
CODE PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT Q FOR Pfail < 2−122 WITHOUT ERASURE INTERVAL
The results in Table I show that the optimal alphabet size for LAC happens to be Q = 2 where a bitrate RBCH = 0.49121
for a BCH code at a decryption failure rate less than 2−122 can be achieved.
For the parameter set [n, q, k] = [1024, 12289, 8] which is used in NewHope Table II shows that an alphabet size of Q = 8
is optimal and that there is a BCH-code achieving a bitrate RBCH = 2.30859 at a decryption failure rate less than 2−216.
We stress that with the methods we proposed here we are able to increase the throughput per ciphertext block but the
presented methods do not enable to shorten the ciphertext blocklength while still transmitting 256 bit instead at the same
security level. This is due to the fact that shortening the polynomial length has a negative effect on the security level of the
scheme. There exists for instance a parameter set within NewHope [10] [n = 512, q = 12289, k = 8] which results in a lower
security level.
Remark 6. Since both NewHope and LAC are designed for the transmission of 256 bit per block which corresponds a bitrate
of 14 for the RLWE-channel we are able to significantly increase the bitrate by using appropriate BCH codes.
Designing the schemes in a way that the bitrate equals 14 makes sense because in this case it is possible to transmit 256 bit
of information. This is equal to one AES256 key [38]. Public key algorithms are often used to share the key of a symmetric
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cryptosystem because those can be implemented very efficiently in hardware and symmetric algorithms are usually able to
perform encryption quicker and without any ciphertext expansion. Due to Grover’s algorithm [39] the brute-force searching
the key can be done in O(N) where N denotes the length of the key in bit. Therefore, in order to obtain a post-quantum
security level of 128 bit at least a key of length N = 256 bit is required for AES.
However, if the the public key encryption scheme shall directly be used to encrypt data or if in the future another symmetric
cryptosystem with a longer key size would be used it makes sense to use transmit more data per ciphertext block. Moreover,
it is possible to share more than one symmetric key between two communication partners with one ciphertext block with a
higher achieved bitrate.
Q d kGV RGV nBCH kBCH RBCH
2 3 1014 0.99023 1023 1013 0.98926
3 5 1004 1.55401 1022 997 1.54317
4 9 989 1.93164 1023 993 1.93945
5 15 970 2.19948 1008 916 2.07704
7 35 920 2.52223 960 789 2.16309
8 49 889 2.60449 1023 788 2.30859
9 69 849 2.62819 1022 709 2.19480
11 121 757 2.55741 976 602 2.03377
13 197 642 2.32000 1020 458 1.65508
16 341 459 1.79297 1023 243 0.94922
TABLE II
CODE PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT Q FOR Pfail < 2−216 WITHOUT ERASURE INTERVAL
B. Combination of erasures and errors
The standard method in the decryption procedure for the demappers of RLWE-based systems (e.g. LAC and NewHope) uses
hard decision. Effectively the channel output is matched to the closest input symbol. This intuitive method has the disadvantage
that soft-information is lost which could be used within the decoder of the ECC.
A prominent example of a decoder that exploits soft-information for Reed-Solomon codes was proposed by Ktter and Vardy
in [40]. The hardware complexity to implement this decoder however is rather high compared to hard decision decoders for
the same code-classes. A first order approximation which still makes use of some soft-information (although not as much as
the Ktter-Vardy algorithm) is to consider certain channel output symbols that are relatively far away from the reproduction
values of the quantizer as erasures. Those values are the ones that are the most likely to have been disturbed by the noise.
Therefore the output alphabet of the demapper is increased by adding an erasure symbol D. With a slight abuse of notation
we also denote the event of an erasure as D.
Because the distribution of a difference noise component (s′e− e′s+ e′′)i is monotonously decreasing away from zero it
is best to allocate the erasure interval centered around the decision thresholds of the hard-decision demapper.
It is obvious that the probability for outputting an erroneous symbol Pr(E) at the demapper decreases with increasing
erasure interval length but of course the erasure probability Pr(D) will increase simultaneously.
We formalize this in the following theorem which shows how to compute Pr(D) and how to upper bound Pr(E) for a
given erasure interval length ε.
Theorem 6. Let the alphabet size be Q and let the probability distribution of a coefficient of the difference noise be denoted
again by ψ. Then the length of an interval is at least b qQc. We consider erasure intervals of even length ε that are centered
around the decision thresholds of the hard-decision demapper presented in Subsection VI-A. Then it holds that
Pr(D) =
ε/2∑
i=−ε/2
ψ
(
i+
⌊
q
2Q
⌋)
+ ψ
(
i−
⌊
q
2Q
⌋)
(27)
and
Pr(E) ≤ 1− Pr(D)−
bq/(2Q)c−ε/2−1∑
i=−bq/(2Q)c+ε/2+1
ψ(i) := Pr(Eε). (28)
Furthermore under the assumption of independent coefficient failures it follows that the decryption failure rate
Pfail ≤
∑
(t,e):2t+e+1>d
(
n
t, e
)
Pr(Eε)tPr(D)e(1− Pr(Eε)− Pr(D))n−t−e . (29)
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Proof: We consider a quantization interval of length b qQc. Without loss of generality we assume the interval to be centered
around zero. Then the outer points of the decision interval are
⌊
q
2Q
⌋
and
(
−
⌊
q
2Q
⌋)
.
Since the erasure intervals are centered symmetrically around the outer points of the quantization intervals and all of them
are of the same length ε, we can just consider that the symbol corresponding to the quantization interval containing the 0 point
was sent. Therefore, Pr(D) is equal to the event that the output symbol Y is contained in the erasure interval belonging to
the quantization interval containing the point 0 which is equal to the right hand side of Equation (27).
The upper bound on the error probability Pr(E) in Inequality (28) follows because
Pr(E) = Pr(D)− Pr(S) ,
where we denoted the probability of a successful reception by Pr(S). The upper bound then follows easily because Pr(S) is
lower bounded by the conditional success probability if an input symbol belonging to one of the shorter quantization intervals
was sent which is equal to the sum in Equation (28).
It is well known that with an error correcting code of minimum distance d it is possible to correct any t errors and e erasures
if
2t+ e+ 1 ≤ d . (30)
Using this fact the upper bound on the decryption failure rate Pfail follows from a standard combinatorial argument.
Within the RLWE channel the probability of the channel output conditioned on the input is the same as the distribution of
the term (s′e − e′s + e′′)i where the index denotes the i − th coefficient of the respective polynomial. Remember that we
assume the coefficients in (s′e− e′s+ e′′) to be identically and independently distributed.
Varying the the erasure intervals changes the probability for an erasure to occur as well as for an error. Therefore, the size
of the erasure intervals can be used as an optimization parameter to achieve a lower decryption failure rate for a code with
fixed minimum distance. Furthermore this methodology enables the designer to increase the code dimension while keeping the
decryption failure rate below a desired threshold.
We used the methodology presented in Theorem 6 to obtain the smallest minimum distance d such that the decryption
failure rates of LAC and NewHope (without ciphertext compression) are below 2−122 and 2−216 respectively. Throughout this
process we optimized the length of the erasure intervals according to the chosen input alphabet size Q.
Comparing the results for LAC including erasure intervals in Table III with Table I for Q = 2 we only get a minor
improvement of about 0.04 for the bitrate of the BCH code RBCH .
The results for NewHope including erasure intervals are shown in Table IV. Compared to the results in Table II the bitrate
of the BCH code RBCH is increased by approximately 0.15 for Q = 8.
Q d kGV RGV nBCH kBCH RBCH
2 106 543 0.53027 1023 552 0.53906
3 363 194 0.30028 728 64 0.09906
4 642 30 0.05859 1023 32 0.06250
5 876 1 0.00227 884 1 0.00227
TABLE III
CODE PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT Q FOR Pfail < 2−122 WITH ERASURE INTERVAL
Q d kGV RGV nBCH kBCH RBCH
2 3 1014 0.99023 1023 1013 0.98926
3 5 1004 1.55401 1022 997 1.54317
4 8 994 1.94141 1023 997 1.94727
5 12 981 2.22443 1008 940 2.13146
7 28 939 2.57432 960 825 2.26178
8 40 911 2.66895 1023 837 2.45215
9 58 873 2.70248 1022 757 2.34339
11 107 783 2.64525 976 647 2.18579
13 180 668 2.41396 1020 501 1.81047
16 322 483 1.88672 1023 243 0.94922
TABLE IV
CODE PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT Q FOR Pfail < 2−216 WITH ERASURE INTERVAL
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VII. CIPHERTEXT COMPRESSION
So far, in this paper ciphertext compression has not yet been considered. Ciphertext compression is deployed in certain
cryptosystems, e.g., in NewHope but not in LAC. The basic technique is described below. We consider the parameter set for
NewHope [n, q, k] = [1024, 12289, 8] within this section.
The original ciphertext is formed by
(u,v) = (as′ + e′, bs′ + e′′ + Encode/Map(m)). (31)
Ciphertext compression is only applied to v whereas no compression is applied to u.
The compression is done coefficient-wise and is described in [10] as well as in [11] using slightly different notation. In this
work we use the notation of the latter one. Ciphertext compression and decompression are shown in this work in Algorithms 4
and 5, respectively. The coefficients of the polynomials within the algorithms are represented in the range [0, q − 1].
The goal of the ciphertext compression is to reduce the amount of bits that have to be transmitted to the receiver as the
ciphertexts generated by RLWE-based algorithms are longer than their corresponding plaintexts. For RLWE-based schemes the
effect of ciphertext compression on the security level is neglected (the effect would only be positive).
In NewHope each coefficient in v is compressed from 14 bits to 3 bits but since the compression is not considered for the
estimation of the security level it is possible to generalize the compression.
We denote the ciphertext compression function by comp and the respective decompression function by decomp.
Algorithm 4: Ciphertext compression
Input: v
for i← 0 to 1024 do
v′i ← d vi·8q c mod 8
end
Result: v′
Algorithm 5: Ciphertext decompression
Input: v′
for i← 0 to 1024 do
v′′i ← d v
′
i·q
8
c
end
Result: v′′
Since the compression function is applied and the decompression function is applied at the receiver the concatenation of
both functions has to be considered as part of the respective RLWE-channel.
For the concatenation of both functions we obtain the following mapping:
decomp(comp)(vi) =

0 if vi ∈ [0, 768] ∪ [11521, 12288]
1536 if vi ∈ [769, 2304]
3072 if vi ∈ [2305, 3840]
4608 if vi ∈ [3841, 5376]
6145 if vi ∈ [5377, 6912]
7681 if vi ∈ [6913, 8448]
9217 if vi ∈ [8449, 9984]
10753 if vi ∈ [9985, 11520]
(32)
A. Compression noise
The compression noise, in the following equations denoted as cN , is defined as the difference between v′′ and v. The
following lemma is essential to determine the compression noise.
Lemma 5. The ciphertext component v = bs′ + e′′ + Encode/Map(m) ∈ Rq as defined in Algorithm 2 can be considered
to have been sampled from the uniform distribution on Rq in the sense that finding a distinguisher for the distribution of v
and the uniform distribution on Rq would imply solving the decisional RLWE problem.
Proof: Assume we have a distinguisher for the distribution of v and the uniform distribution on Rq . This implies that we
can distinguish the distribution of (b,v) from the uniform distribution on Rq×Rq . Furthermore we could use this distinguisher
to solve the RLWE problem in the following way. Given samples (ai, bi) we could use the bi to create samples of the form
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(bi,vi). If the distribution of the vi can be distinguished from the uniform distribution so can be the distribution of the bi.
To see why this is true consider that v = bs′ + e′′ +Encode/Map(m) and b = as+ e. Adding the encoded message can be
interpreted as a bijective mapping on the discrete and finite set Rq and therefore has no influence on the statement. The two
distributions can only differ because the distribution of b is different from the distribution of a which is by definition uniform
on Rq . Therefore, to sum up we would be able to distinguish RLWE samples (ai, bi) from uniform samples on Rq ×Rq if
we could distinguish the distribution of v from the uniform one in contradiction to the assumed hardness of the decisional
RLWE-problem.
We define the sets
Vj := {x ∈ Rq : decomp(comp)(x) = j} (33)
where j ∈ {0, 1536, 3072, 4608, 6145, 7681, 9217, 10753}. Those partition the interval [0, 12288].
Corollary 2. It holds that
Pr(vi|v′′i ) =
1
Vj (34)
where v′′i = decomp(comp)(vi).
Proof: According to Lemma 5 all values for vi can be considered equiprobable. That implies that the probability of
a certain input v after the concatenation decomp(comp)(v) = v′′ is equiprobable on the set of all possible values of v
conditioned on v′′.
Since we have a discrete setting the interval [0, 12288] cannot be subdivided into intervals of equal length (12289 is in fact
prime).
Every x is in some unique Vj′ . To each Vj there is an interval Aj such that x = j + a with a ∈ Aj .
j ∈ {1536, 3072, 4608}, Aj = [−767, 768]
j ∈ {6145, 7681, 9217, 10753}, Aj = [−768, 767]
j = 0, A0 = [−768, 768].
For our further analysis we are considering the parameters of A0 because it is the longest of the aforementioned intervals.
Recall that the ciphertext without compression is the pair (u,v). If we use ciphertext compression, we denote the ciphertext
after compression and decompression as (u,v′′).
The decoding algorithm is not changed at all compared to the decoder without compression but the additional noise term,
which we refer to as cN in this work, of course increases the coefficient failure probability.
It holds that
v′′ − us = v + cN − us = bs′ + e′′ + Encode/Map(m) + cN − ass′ − e′s (35)
= (as+ e)s′ + e′′ + cN − ass′ − e′s+ Encode/Map(m) (36)
= es′ + e′′ − e′s+ cN + Encode/Map(m) . (37)
The previous equation shows that to the difference noise term which was previously considered an additional compression
noise term is added. The compression noise is uniformly distributed. We are considering the worst case such that the compression
noise is uniformly distributed on the interval [−768, 768].
We have to show how to treat the resulting noise which is composed out of difference and compression noise when it comes
to computing the lower bound on CRLWE shown in Theorem 5 and the upper bounds on the decryption failure rate presented
in Theorem 3 and Theorem 6.
In order to do so we argue why we can assume the difference and the compression noise to be stochastically independent
with respect to each other.
Proposition 1. Let q be a prime number. If the polynomial ss′ ∈ Rq is not equal to the zero polynomial (0) compression
noise cN and difference noise es′ + e′′ − e′s are stochastically independent with respect to each other.
Proof: In order to show this statement we first recap the definition of the ciphertext component
v = bs′ + e′′ + Encode/Map(m) = ass′ + es′ + e′′ + Encode/Map(m) .
We define g := ss′ which is unequal to the zero polynomial in Rq by the condition of the proposition.
Without loss of generality we assume that g0 is unequal to 0. Next observe that
(ag)0 = a0g0 −
n−1∑
i=1
aign−i .
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Since a is sampled from the uniform distribution on Rq , a0 is uniformly sampled on Zq . It follows that a0g0 is also uniformly
distributed on Zq and the values of s, e, s′, e′ and e′′ are stochastically independent from the compression noise as long as
ss′ 6= 0 and therefore the same also holds for the difference noise. The same statement holds for all other coefficients of ag.
From this we can conclude that v conditioned on the difference noise is still uniformly distributed and therefore compression
noise and difference noise are stochastically independent with respect to each other.
Remark 7. The probability that ss′ = 0 is very small. If either s = 0 or s′ = 0 then of course ss′ = 0. This case is very
unlikely to occur (≈ 6.83 ·10−2567) and therefore we neglect this case. The other case is if both s 6= 0 and s′ 6= 0 but ss′ = 0.
This case occurs if ss′ is a multiple of xn + 1. The probability of this event is harder to compute but still we assume it to be
very small as well because in this case the polynomials have to match in a way that ss′ = 0 and for a given s there are not
many options for s′ that fulfill this property.
We compute the overall noise by a convolution of difference and compression noise. This is approach is only valid because
we have shown that we may consider both noise sources to be stochastically independent with respect to each other. We denote
the resulting noise distribution (including difference and compression noise) of one coefficient by ψ′. It holds that
ψ′ = ψ ∗ U(A0) (38)
where U(A0) denotes the uniform distribution on the set A0 = [−768, 768] and ψ denotes the difference noise distribution of
one coefficient (see also Lemma 1).
Remark 8. In order to adapt Theorems 5, 3 and 6 to be used for cryptosystems including compression noise it is enough
to replace ψ by ψ′ as defined in Equation (38). Essentially the proofs of the theorems remain the same even if we include
ciphertext compression.
The lower bound on the channel capacity of the RLWE-channel for NewHope including the compression noise is shown
in Fig. 8. If we compare the results to the case without compression noise in Fig. 6 we conclude that the compression noise
lowers the channel capacity which was to be expected.
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Fig. 8. I(X;Y ) depending on Q for quasi-equidistant input symbols for NewHope (n = 1024, q = 12289, χ8) with compression noise
Q d kGV RGV nBCH kBCH RBCH
2 3 1014 0.9902 1023 1013 0.98926
3 10 978 1.51376 1022 950 1.47042
4 33 901 1.7598 1023 903 1.76367
5 81 784 1.7777 939 554 1.25620
7 369 344 0.9431 960 91 0.24948
8 577 150 0.4395 993 22 0.06445
TABLE V
CODE PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT Q FOR Pfail < 2−216 WITH CIPHERTEXT COMPRESSION AND WITHOUT ERASURE INTERVALS
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Q d kGV RGV nBCH kBCH RBCH
2 3 1014 0.9902 1023 1013 0.98926
3 9 983 1.52150 1022 961 1.48745
4 26 924 1.80469 1023 932 1.82031
5 70 811 1.83895 939 586 1.32876
7 348 370 1.01438 960 105 0.28786
8 552 171 0.50098 993 32 0.09375
TABLE VI
CODE PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT Q FOR Pfail < 2−216 WITH CIPHERTEXT COMPRESSION AND WITH ERASURE INTERVALS
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Fig. 9. Output distribution for uniformly distributed inputs with quasi-equidistant input symbols for different Q and NewHope with ciphertext compression
Considering NewHope with ciphertext compression, we see from the results in Tables V and VI that we increase the
throughput by using a larger alphabet size Q at the channel input and an ECC correcting the errors inflicted by the channel.
The results presented in both tables are for a decryption failure rate Pfail < 2−216. Furthermore, we find that under the
assumption of independent coefficient failures the rates achieved by the BCH-code are relatively close to the channel capacity
(difference of about 1 bit per channel use) of the RLWE-channel for NewHope parameters including the compression noise.
It is not surprising that the results including compression noise achieve a lower rate. Effectively we have added an additional
noise source. Furthermore it is not surprising that the positive effect on the bitrate by increasing the input alphabet size of
the channel Q symbols saturates earlier. This is due to the broadening of the error distribution (compare Fig. 7 and Fig. 9 for
Q = 2) via the convolution with a uniform random variable. Fig. 9 shows that for Q = 9 the output distribution PY is already
close to being uniform. If the alphabet size is gets sufficiently increased information is contained within the less significant
bits of the encoded message. Those are then corrupted by the ciphertext compression even in absence of any difference noise.
B. Effective rates for NewHope with ciphertext compression
As mentioned in Subsection VII-A ciphertext compression lowers the channel capacity of the RLWE-channel. However, as
we will show in this subsection the number information symbols which can be communicated between Alice and Bob per
transmitted symbol may even be increased by using ciphertext compression.
This observation may come as a surprise to the reader but we stress that the RLWE-channel and the communication channel
that Alice and Bob use are two different things and the achievable rates for those channels are independent from each other.
In fact in our analysis we assume the communication channel between Alice and Bob to have a binary alphabet and to be
noiseless.
For NewHope the ciphertext compression reduces each coefficient of the ciphertext component v from 14 bit down to 3
bit whereas u is not affected by the compression. Therefore we reduce the number of bits which have to be communicated
over the channel by a factor of 1728 resulting in an effective increase in terms of capacity of the RLWE-channel by a factor of
28
17 . This effective increase follows also for the lower bound on the capacity of the RLWE-channel given in Fig. 8 as well as
the bitrates in Tables V and VI. We refer to this effectively increased bitrate as the effective bitrate achieved by our coding
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Fig. 10. Comparsion of lower on the achievable rate and the effective achievable rate for different input alphabet sizes Q
strategies for the RLWE-channel. We also point out that the actual achieved rate we achieve for the communication channel
is only half the rate achieved on the RLWE-channel due to the fact that the ciphertext is composed out of two polynomials
c = (u,v). As we defined the rate with respect to the RLWE-channel this factor 12 is not included in any tables within
this work. For the estimation of the data transmission requirements of the schemes it has to be taken into account. Whether
ciphertext compression is deployed or not does not matter in this case.
The already presented lower bounds for the capacity of the RLWE-channel for NewHope with and without ciphertext
compression (Fig. 8 and 6) are again plotted in Fig. 10 together with the lower bound on the effective capacity of the RLWE-
channel for NewHope with ciphertext compression. The results show that the lower bound on the capacity for NewHope with
ciphertext compression is actually larger than the lower bound on the capacity without compression.
It remains to show whether the effective bitrate is increasing for NewHope at a decryption failure rate of 2−216. In Table VII
we compare the results of the effective bitrate RBCHeff for NewHope with and without ciphertext compression for the hard-
decision decoder. The results using erasure intervals are are presented in Table VIII. The results show that up to an alphabet
size Q = 4 it is better to use ciphertext compression. Beyond that the performance without ciphertext compression is better.
Overall the best results are achieved for Q = 4 when ciphertext compression is deployed.
Q RBCHeff NewHope w.o. compression RBCHeff NewHope with compression
2 0.98926 1.62937
3 1.54317 2.42187
4 1.93945 2.90487
5 2.07704 2.06904
7 2.16309 0.41091
8 2.30859 0.10615
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVE RATES FOR NEWHOPE WITH AND WITHOUT CIPHERTEXT COMPRESSION, NO ERASURE INTERVALS
Q RBCHeff NewHope w.o. compression RBCHeff NewHope with compression
2 0.98926 1.62937
3 1.54317 2.44992
4 1.94727 2.99816
5 2.13146 2.18855
7 2.26178 0.47412
8 2.45215 0.15441
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVE RATES FOR NEWHOPE WITH AND WITHOUT CIPHERTEXT COMPRESSION WITH ERASURE INTERVALS
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VIII. ACHIEVABLE DECRYPTION FAILURE RATE FOR A FIXED BITRATE
Recall that (Remark 6) public-key encryption schemes are frequently deployed to share a symmetric key in a secure manner
between Alice and Bob. In case of AES256 the symmetric key length is 256 bit which corresponds to a bitrate of 14 for the
RLWE-channel.
In Table IX we present the decryption failure rates for different input alphabet sizes Q with a bitrate of at least 14 for LAC,
NewHope without ciphertext compression and NewHope with ciphertext compression when we deploy BCH-codes for error
correction. The results in this table were obtained for hard decision decoders (no erasure intervals). Notice that also for NewHope
with ciphertext compression we have to consider the bitrate and not the effective bitrate introduced in Subsection VII-B.
As we can see in all cases Q = 2 performs best whereas if we fix the decryption failure rate e.g. to 2−216 for NewHope
with ciphertext compression Q = 4 achieves the highest data rate according to Table V. These results do not contradict each
other as the coefficient failure probability varies in Q and therefore the optimal alphabet size may vary for fixed decryption
failure rates.
Q d DFR LAC DFR NewHope DFR NewHope compressed
2 214 2−213 2−21046 2−12764
3 213 2−17.86 2−9555 2−4305
4 424 2−12.43 2−10837 2−3643
5 299 2−4.81e−16 2−4794 2−1074
7 366 ≈ 1 2−2886 2−213
8 390 2−8.10e−14 2−2296 2−68
TABLE IX
DECRYPTION FAILURE RATES FOR DIFFERENT ALPHABET SIZES Q FOR A BCH-BITRATE AT LEAST 0.25 WITHOUT ERASURE INTERVALS
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work we have shown how to treat RLWE-based cryptosystems as communication channels. We have derived lower
bounds on the channel capacities for the parameter sets of LAC and NewHope. Our results show that increasing the alphabet
size of the channel at the input, increases the channel capacity. It was also shown why this effect saturates at a certain point.
Furthermore it was reasoned why increasing the alphabet size at the input of the channel does not have a negative effect on
the security level those cryptosystems.
Under the assumption of stochastically independent coefficient failures we have presented achievability results regarding
the bitrate based on the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for the parameter sets and required decryption failure rates of LAC and
NewHope. Furthermore we have given bitrates which can be achieved by using BCH codes for the same paramter sets. We
have also shown how to deploy a first order approximation of soft-decoding into the decoders of error correcting codes used
within RLWE-based schemes and quantified the resulting effect.
It was shown that ciphertext compression lowers the capacity of the RLWE channel. However, we have also shown that the
effective rate achieved by the communication system which is the figure of merit designers should aim for is even increased by
the ciphertext compression for the alphabet sizes Q which are the most important in practice. Modifications in the ciphertext
compression are a potential source of further optimization to increase the throughput of the overall system but we did not
investigate its effect in this work.
At the end we provide Table X that summarizes important results obtained in this work. The table shows the rates that
our encoding schemes can achieve for the RLWE-channel for the parameter sets used in LAC and NewHope fulfilling the
respective requirements on the decryption failure rate of LAC and NewHope (LAC: 2−122, NewHope: 2−216). Our results show
that we are able to increase the bitrate for NewHope with ciphertext compression by a factor of 7. For LAC we are able to
almost double the bitrate. Furthermore, we provide the effective achievable bitrate for NewHope with ciphertext compression.
The final two columns specify the minimal achievable decryption failure rate by using BCH codes for optimal alphabet sizes
(QDFR = 2 in all cases).
Q RBCH RBCHeff QDFR min. DFR
LAC 2 0.49121 0.49121 2 2−213
NewHope without compression 8 2.30859 2.30859 2 2−21046
NewHope with compression 4 1.76367 2.90487 2 2−12764
TABLE X
RESULTING RATES, EFFECTIVE RATES AND MINIMAL DECRYPTION FAILURE RATES FOR A BITRATE OF 0.25 FOR LAC, NEWHOPE WITHOUT CIPHERTEXT
COMPRESSION AND NEWHOPE WITH CIPHERTEXT COMPRESSION. IN ALL CASES WE ARE CONSIDERING DEMAPPERS WITHOUT AN ERASURE SYMBOL.
24
REFERENCES
[1] P. W. Shor, “Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer,” SIAM review, vol. 41, no. 2, pp.
303–332, 1999.
[2] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Post-quantum cryptography standardization.” [Online]. Available: https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/
Post-Quantum-Cryptography
[3] O. Regev, “On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography,” Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 1–40, 2009.
[4] V. Lyubashevsky, C. Peikert, and O. Regev, “On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings,” Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 1–35,
2013.
[5] E. Lee, Y.-S. Kim, J.-S. No, M. Song, and D.-J. Shin, “Modification of frodokem using gray and error-correcting codes,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp.
179 564–179 574, 2019.
[6] J. Bos, C. Costello, L. Ducas, I. Mironov, M. Naehrig, V. Nikolaenko, A. Raghunathan, and D. Stebila, “Frodo: Take off the ring! practical, quantum-secure
key exchange from lwe,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016, pp. 1006–1018.
[7] C. E. Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell system technical journal, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 379–423, 1948.
[8] S. R. Fluhrer, “Cryptanalysis of ring-lwe based key exchange with key share reuse.” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2016, p. 85, 2016.
[9] X. Lu, Y. Liu, D. Jia, H. Xue, J. He, and Z. Zhang, “Supporting documentation: LAC,” 2017, https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/
Round-2-Submissions.
[10] E. Alkim, R. Avanzi, J. Bos, L. Ducas, A. de la Piedra, T. Po¨ppelmann, P. Schwabe, and D. Stebila, “Newhope: Algorithm specification and supporting
documentation. submission to the nist post-quantum cryptography standardization project, 2017,” 2019.
[11] E. Alkim, L. Ducas, T. Po¨ppelmann, and P. Schwabe, “Newhope without reconciliation.” IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., vol. 2016, p. 1157, 2016.
[12] T. Fritzmann, T. Po¨ppelmann, and J. Sepulveda, “Analysis of error-correcting codes for lattice-based key exchange,” in International Conference on
Selected Areas in Cryptography. Springer, 2018, pp. 369–390.
[13] J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, J. H. Silverman, and J. H. Silverman, An introduction to mathematical cryptography. Springer, 2008, vol. 1.
[14] C. Peikert, “A decade of lattice cryptography,” Foundations and Trends R© in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 283–424, 2016.
[15] J. Katz and Y. Lindell, Introduction to modern cryptography. CRC press, 2014.
[16] E. N. Gilbert, “A comparison of signalling alphabets,” The Bell system technical journal, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 504–522, 1952.
[17] R. R. Varshamov, “Estimate of the number of signals in error correcting codes,” Docklady Akad. Nauk, SSSR, vol. 117, pp. 739–741, 1957.
[18] O. Regev, “On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography,” in Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing, ser. STOC 05. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2005, p. 8493. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060603
[19] B. Applebaum, D. Cash, C. Peikert, and A. Sahai, “Fast cryptographic primitives and circular-secure encryption based on hard learning problems,” in
Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 2009, pp. 595–618.
[20] M. Ajtai, “Generating hard instances of lattice problems,” in Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 1996,
pp. 99–108.
[21] ——, “The shortest vector problem in l2 is np-hard for randomized reductions,” in Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, 1998, pp. 10–19.
[22] D. Micciancio, “The hardness of the closest vector problem with preprocessing,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 1212–1215,
2001.
[23] A. Langlois and D. Stehle´, “Worst-case to average-case reductions for module lattices,” Designs, Codes and Cryptography, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 565–599,
2015.
[24] R. Avanzi, J. Bos, L. Ducas, E. Kiltz, T. Lepoint, V. Lyubashevsky, J. M. Schanck, P. Schwabe, G. Seiler, and D. Stehle´, “CRYSTALS-Kyber: Algorithm
Specifications And Supporting Documentation,” 2019, https://www.pq-crystals.org/kyber/data/kyber-specification-round2.pdf.
[25] A. Banerjee, C. Peikert, and A. Rosen, “Pseudorandom functions and lattices,” in Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 2012, pp. 719–737.
[26] S. Bhattacharya, O. Garcia-Morchon, T. Laarhoven, R. Rietman, M.-J. O. Saarinen, L. Tolhuizen, and Z. Zhang, “Round5: Compact and fast post-quantum
public-key encryption.” IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., vol. 2018, p. 725, 2018.
[27] E. Alkim, L. Ducas, T. Po¨ppelmann, and P. Schwabe, “Post-quantum key exchangea new hope,” in 25th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX}
Security 16), 2016, pp. 327–343.
[28] V. Lyubashevsky, “Lattice signatures without trapdoors,” in Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques.
Springer, 2012, pp. 738–755.
[29] C. Gentry, C. Peikert, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions,” in Proceedings of the fortieth annual
ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 2008, pp. 197–206.
[30] E. Fujisaki and T. Okamoto, “Secure integration of asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes,” in Annual International Cryptology Conference.
Springer, 1999, pp. 537–554.
[31] E. E. Targhi and D. Unruh, “Post-quantum security of the fujisaki-okamoto and oaep transforms,” in Theory of Cryptography Conference. Springer,
2016, pp. 192–216.
[32] D. Hofheinz, K. Ho¨velmanns, and E. Kiltz, “A modular analysis of the fujisaki-okamoto transformation,” in Theory of Cryptography Conference.
Springer, 2017, pp. 341–371.
[33] M.-J. O. Saarinen, “Supporting documentation: HILA5,” 2017, https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/Round-1-Submissions.
[34] X. Lu, Y. Liu, D. Jia, H. Xue, J. He, and Z. Zhang, “Supporting documentation: LAC,” 2017, https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/
Round-1-Submissions.
[35] J.-P. DAnvers, F. Vercauteren, and I. Verbauwhede, “The impact of error dependencies on ring/mod-lwe/lwr based schemes,” in International Conference
on Post-Quantum Cryptography. Springer, 2019, pp. 103–115.
[36] G. Maringer, T. Fritzmann, and J. Seplveda, “The influence of lwe/rlwe parameters on the stochastic dependence of decryption failures,” Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2019/1469, 2019, https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1469.
[37] R. Lindner and C. Peikert, “Better key sizes (and attacks) for lwe-based encryption,” in Cryptographers Track at the RSA Conference. Springer, 2011,
pp. 319–339.
[38] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, “The block cipher rijndael,” in International Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. Springer,
1998, pp. 277–284.
[39] L. K. Grover, “A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search,” in Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, 1996, pp. 212–219.
[40] R. Koetter and A. Vardy, “Algebraic soft-decision decoding of reed-solomon codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 49, no. 11, pp.
2809–2825, 2003.
